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ABSTRACT
In October 2019, the D.C. Circuit handed down its
much-anticipated decision in Mozilla v. FCC, relying
heavily on Chevron Deference and the Supreme Court’s
2005 Brand X decision. The per curiam opinion upheld large
portions of the FCC’s 2018 Restoring Internet Freedom
Order, but also undermined the FCC’s preemption of state
law while also remanding issues related to public
safety, pole attachments, and the Lifeline Program to the
agency, assuring that the legal and policy battles over net
neutrality will continue. This Article traces the history of the
FCC’s efforts on net neutrality as it has moved in and out of
court since the FCC’s 2005 Policy Statement before
exploring the decision in Mozilla. The Article then argues
that the continuing uncertainty over net neutrality regulation
should be resolved by Congress.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2017, the FCC voted 3-2 along party lines to repeal
its net neutrality rules.1 The order repealed the Title II rules passed
in 2015 that had prohibited ISPs from blocking and throttling lawful
internet content and prohibited paid prioritization for internet
content delivery.2 This change would allow ISPs to favor some
internet traffic over others.3 The FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom
order prompted immediate criticism from observers as well as
lawsuits from several companies, states and organizations before the
1

In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 529–32, 533–41,
834-42, 843-45, 846-48 (2018) [hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom]. Those
who voted yes included: Commissioners O’Rielly and Carr, as well as Chairman
Pai. Those who voted no included: Commissioners Clyburn and Rosenworcel. Id.
The commissioners of the FCC were vocal about their opposition to or approval
of the repeal. In dissenting vigorously, Commissioner Clyburn’s stated that
greater issues – not just procedural sufficiency – loomed, “There has been a darker
side to all of this over the past few weeks. Threats and intimidation. . . Particularly
damning is what today’s repeal will mean for marginalized groups, like
communities of color. . . . I close my eulogy of our 2015 net neutrality rules[.]”
Commissioner O’Rielly’s statement focused on explaining away accused
procedural malfeasance, “Some would have us believe that the comment process
has been irreparably tainted by the large number of fake comments,” and itself
was critical of the dissenting commissioners’ knowledge of agency procedural
requirements, “That view reflects a lack of understanding about the
Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. at 533-41, 834-42.
2
47 C.F.R. § 8 (2015); see also Restoring Internet Freedom at 312–13.
3
47 C.F.R. § 8 (2018); see also In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting
the Open Internet (Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet), 30 FCC Rcd.
5601, 5607– 08 (2015).
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D.C. Circuit.4 After the FCC published the Restoring Internet
Freedom order, Mozilla became the lead plaintiff as the first to
formally re-file its complaint asserting that the FCC “depart[ed]
from its prior reasoning and precedent” and, therefore, “violate[d]
federal law,” including the Communications Act of 1934, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, and FCC regulations
promulgated thereunder.5
After oral arguments, but before a decision was released, in an
August 20, 2019 declaration submitted to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, Santa Clara County Fire Chief Anthony
Bowden alleged that Verizon Wireless had throttled the internet
services of the Santa Clara County Central Fire Protection District
(County Fire).6 According to the declaration, which was filed as an
addendum to a brief filed by 22 state attorneys general to the D.C.
Circuit, County Fire “relies on Internet-based systems to provide
crucial and time-sensitive public safety services.” 7 However,
Bowden asserted that the department “experienced throttling by its
ISP, Verizon,”8 namely that its “data rates had been reduced to
1/200, or less, than the previous speeds.” 9 Bowden contended that
the reduced speeds “severely interfered with [County Fire’s] ability
to function effectively,”10 including during wildfires that “resulted
4

Christopher Terry, Scott Memmel, & Ashley Turacek, Lost in a Novelty
Mug: U.S. Telecom, the FCC, and Policy Resolution for Net Neutrality, 41
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 26 (2019).
5
Protective Petition for Review at 2, Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n
Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-1051), (available at
https://blog.mozilla.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/AS-FILED-MozillaProtective-Petition-16Jan2018-1.pdf).
6
Brief for Government Petitioners at 23-24, Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n
Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-1051), 2018 WL 6242983 at 2324; see also Jon Brodkin, Verizon Throttled Fire Department’s “Unlimited” Data
During
Calif.
Wildfire,
ARS
TECHNICA
(Aug.
21,
2018),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/08/verizon-throttled-fire-departmentsunlimited-data-during-calif-wildfire/.
7
See Brief for Government Petitioners at 10, Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n
Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-1051).
8
Addendum to Brief for Government Petitioners at 5 Mozilla Corp. v. Fed.
Commc’n Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-1051).
9
Id. at 6.
10
Id. at 5.
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in over 726,000 acres burned and roughly 2,000 structures
destroyed.”11
The next day, Verizon sent a statement to Ars Technica
acknowledging that it should not have throttled County Fire’s data
service, especially after the department had requested that Verizon
lift the restrictions.12 Verizon explained their side of what went
wrong:
Regardless of the plan emergency responders
choose, we have a practice to remove data speed
restrictions when contacted in emergency situations
. . . . We have done that many times, including for
emergency personnel responding to these tragic fires.
In this situation, we should have lifted the speed
restriction when our customer reached out to us. This
was a customer support mistake. We are reviewing
the situation and will fix any issues going forward. 13
Verizon argued that the throttling was due to a customer service
error and had “nothing to do with net neutrality.” 14 However, in an
August 22 statement, the Santa Clara County Counsel’s Office
contended that the throttling had “everything to do with net
neutrality—it shows that the ISPs will act in their economic
interests, even at the expense of public safety,” adding, “[t]hat is

11

Id.
Jon Brodkin, Fire Dept. Rejects Verizon’s “Customer Support Mistake”
Excuse
for
Throttling,
ARS
TECHNICA
(Aug.
22,
2018),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/08/fire-dept-rejects-verizons-customersupport-mistake-excuse-for-throttling/. Brodkin explained that previously, on
June 29, 2019, Fire Captain Justin Stockman had written an email to Verizon,
noting that “download speeds for an essential device used during large disasters
had been throttled from 50Mbps to about 30kbps,” leading to a series of emails
between Verizon and the department.
13
Id.
14
Id.; see also Net Neutrality, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
https://www.eff.org/issues/net-neutrality (last visited July 15, 2019). EFF defines
net neutrality as “the idea that Internet service providers (ISPs) should treat all
data that travels over their networks fairly, without improper discrimination in
favor of particular apps, sites or services.” Id.
12
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exactly what the Trump Administration’s repeal of net neutrality
allows and encourages.”15
On October 1, 2019, the D.C. Circuit released a per curiam
opinion which upheld the FCC’s repeal of the net neutrality rules.16
The court held that the FCC had the authority to repeal the agency’s
2015 Title II provisions and had been reasonable in its approach to
doing so.17 However, the court also remanded several issues back to
the FCC, including requirements that the agency assess the
rollback’s effect on public safety.18 The court also prohibited the
FCC from barring states from drafting their own net neutrality
regulations.19
This Article argues that the D.C. Circuit ruling in Mozilla—
which concluded that the FCC was due wide deference to repeal the
rules despite remanding several issues back to the agency—will
greatly extend the long running policy and legal debate over net
neutrality. Absent an act of Congress to provide the FCC with
guidance, the legal battles will continue both at the state and federal
levels. Because the FCC’s back and forth approach to structural
internet regulation is likely to lead to more uncertainty, this Article
argues that resolution of the issue is desirable. Furthermore, this
Article contends that, ideally, net neutrality provisions should be
restored because such rules can, and do, promote free expression on
the internet.
To explore this argument, this Article first walks through the
history of the net neutrality debate from the FCC’s initial proposal
15

Jon Brodkin, supra note 12.
Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per
curiam).
17
Id. at 57–59 (stating that, “We are, however, satisfied by the Commission’s
other reasons for believing competition exists in the broadband market. . . the
Commission barely survives arbitrary and capricious review on this issue.”); see
also Marguerite Reardon, Net Neutrality Court Ruling: States Can Set Own Rules,
CNET (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/net-neutrality-court-rulingstates-can-set-own-rules/; see also Adi Robertson, The FCC Can Repeal Net
Neutrality, but it Can’t Block State Laws, Says Court, VERGE (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/1/20893342/fcc-net-neutrality-repeal-dcappeals-court-ruling-state-law-preemption.
18
Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 59.
19
Margaret Harding McGill, Court Mostly OKs FCC’s Net Neutrality Repeal
but Lets States Craft Their Own Rules, POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/01/fcc-net-neutrality-014801.
16
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in 2005 through the agency’s 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom
order. Second, this Article discusses the D.C. Circuit’s decision,
focusing especially on the court’s application of Chevron deference
as well as the three issues remanded to the FCC. Finally, this Article
argues that Congress, or at the very least the states, need to act on
this issue as net neutrality rules are an important mechanism that
maximize opportunities for political participation by protecting free
expression from private monopolization on the internet.
I. BACKGROUND
The following Part first provides background on the evolution
of the net neutrality debate and key considerations regarding FCC
decision-making between 2005 and the FCC’s adoption of the 2017
Restoring Internet Freedom Order. Second, it provides important
background information on the Chevron Doctrine and deference.
A. Net Neutrality
Net neutrality, a term coined by Tim Wu,20 is a regulatory
concept that can be traced back to the FCC’s 2005 policy statement
contending that anyone who can access the internet should be able
to access any content on any device.21 In support of this contention,
the FCC cited § 230(b) of the amended Communications Act of
1934 which included Congress’ policy to “preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet” and
“to promote the continued development of the Internet.” 22
Under the guidance of these Congressional directives and “to
ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open,
affordable, and accessible to all consumers,” 23 the FCC adopted four
principles:
20

Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 144 (2003) (discussing the “normative
principle of network neutrality”).
21
In the Matter of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the
Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986–88 (2005) [hereinafter
Framework]; see also Terry, Memmel, & Turacek, supra note 4.
22
47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2012).
23
Framework, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14987; supra note 4, at 4.
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To encourage broadband deployment and preserve
and promote the open and interconnected nature of
the public Internet, consumers are entitled to
access the lawful Internet content of their choice.



To encourage broadband deployment and preserve
and promote the open and interconnected nature of
the public Internet, consumers are entitled to run
applications and use services of their choice,
subject to the needs of law enforcement.



To encourage broadband deployment and preserve
and promote the open and interconnected nature of
the public Internet, consumers are entitled to
connect their choice of legal devices that do not
harm the network.



To encourage broadband deployment and preserve
and promote the open and interconnected nature of
the public Internet, consumers are entitled to
competition among network providers, application
and service providers, and content providers. 24

Five years later, a challenge was brought against the FCC’s
authority to enforce the four principles after several of Comcast’s
high-speed internet service subscribers discovered that the company
had interfered with peer-to-peer networking applications.25 In
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, the court focused on whether the FCC had
authority to regulate an ISP’s network management practices. 26 The
FCC argued they had the authority to classify ISPs as “information
services” under Title I of the Communications Act of 1934. 27

24

Framework, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14988, supra note 21 (emphasis omitted).
See Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, ASSOC. PRESS
(Oct.
19,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/10/19/AR2007101900842.html; see also Terry,
Memmel, & Turack, supra note 4.
26
600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
27
Id. at 649–50.
25
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The case arose after several of Comcast’s high-speed internet
service subscribers alleged that the company was interfering with
their use of peer-to-peer networking applications, which generally
allow users to send files with each other without going through a
central server.28 Such programs present competition for cable
providers because they allow users to view high-quality videos that
they would otherwise have to pay for on cable television through
networking protocols like BitTorrent. 29 In 2007, the Associated
Press concluded that Comcast “actively interferes with attempts by
some of its high-speed Internet subscribers to share files online.” 30
The Electronic Frontier Foundation reached a similar conclusion,
finding that Comcast was selectively targeting customers who
uploaded files using BitTorrent and other peer-to-peer protocols. 31
Comcast later admitted to interfering with peer-to-peer traffic,
contending that it interfered “only during periods of peak network
congestion” and only “during periods of heavy network traffic.” 32
In November 2007, Free Press, an advocacy group focused on
media reform, filed a complaint with the FCC requesting that the
agency declare “that an Internet service provider violates the
28

See Svensson, supra note 25.
See id.; see also Framework, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14988.
30
Svensson, supra note 25. The AP continued: “Comcast’s interference
affects all types of content, meaning that, for instance, an independent movie
producer who wanted to distribute his work using BitTorrent and his Comcast
connection could find that difficult or impossible.” Id. The AP further discovered
that Comcast’s conduct had a “drastic effect . . . on one type of traffic _ [sic] in
some cases blocking it rather than slowing it down,” concluding that the method
used by Comcast was “difficult to circumvent and involves [Comcast] falsifying
network traffic.” Id.
31
Peter Eckersley, Fred von Lohmann, & Seth Schoen, Packet Forgery By
ISPs: A Report On the Comcast Affair, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 28,
2017),
https://www.eff.org/wp/packet-forgery-isps-report-comcast-affair.
Electronic Frontier Foundation reached a similar conclusion, finding that Comcast
was selectively targeting customers who uploaded files using BitTorrent and other
peer-to-peer protocols.
32
In the Matter of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge
Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications
(Comcast Complaint), 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 13032 (2007) (citing Letter from
Mary McManus, Senior Director of FCC and Regulatory Policy, Comcast
Corporation, to Kris A. Monteith, Chief, Enforcement Bureau, File No. EB-08IH-1518, at 5 (Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast Response Letter]).
29
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[Commission’s] Internet Policy Statement when it intentionally
degrades a targeted Internet application.”33 Free Press also filed a
petition for declaratory ruling requesting the FTC to “clarify that an
Internet service provider violates the FCC’s Internet Policy
Statement when it intentionally degrades a targeted Internet
application.”34
In a petition for rulemaking, Vuze, Inc. asked the FCC “to adopt
reasonable rules that would prevent the network operators from
engaging in practices that discriminate against particular Internet
applications, content or technologies.”35 The FCC summarily issued
an order which stated that the agency had jurisdiction over
Comcast’s network management practices, and that it could resolve
the dispute through adjudication rather than through rulemaking. 36
Comcast complied with the order, but raised three objections.
First, Comcast argued that the FCC did not have jurisdiction over its
network management practices.37 Second, it argued that the FCC’s
adjudicatory action was procedurally flawed because it
circumvented the rulemaking requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act and violated the notice requirements of the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.38 Finally, Comcast asserted
that parts of the order were poorly reasoned, and were, as a result,
arbitrary and capricious.39
The D.C. Circuit discussed § 4(i) of the Communications Act of
1934, which authorizes the FCC to “perform any and all acts, make
such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent
with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its
functions.”40 In Comcast, the FCC did not claim that Congress had
given it express authority to regulate Comcast’s internet services. 41
In fact, in its 2002 Cable Modem order, the Commission ruled that
cable internet service is neither a “telecommunications service”
33

Id.
Id. at 13033.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2018).
41
Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 645.
34
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covered by Title II of the Communications Act nor a “cable service”
covered by Title VI.42 The Commission based its authority over
Comcast’s network management practices on the broad language of
§ 154(i) of the Act, which provides that the FCC can make rules and
issue orders “as may be necessary in the execution of its
functions.”43
Courts refer to the Commission’s § 154(i) power as its
“ancillary” authority, a label derived from three Supreme Court
decisions.44 In American Library Ass’n v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit
distilled the holdings of these three cases into a two-part test, 45
holding that the FCC “may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only when
two conditions are satisfied: (1) the Commission’s general
jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the Communications Act]
covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably
ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its
statutorily mandated responsibilities.”46 Comcast conceded that the
FCC’s action satisfied the first requirement because the company’s
internet service qualified as “interstate and foreign communication
by wire” within the meaning of Title I.47 The court was then tasked
with deciding whether the FCC’s action satisfied the second prong
of the American Library test.
The FCC argued that the order satisfied American Library’s
second requirement because it was “reasonably ancillary to the
Commission’s effective performance” of its responsibilities under
42
67 Fed. Reg. 18,907 (Apr. 17, 2002); see generally In the Matter of Inquiry
Concerning High–Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities,
17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (2002), aff’d, National Cable and Telecomm. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (giving further background on the
reasoning behind this decision).
43
47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2018); Comcast Complaint, 23 FCC Rcd. at 13035–36.
44
See, United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); United
States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 649 (1972); FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689 (1979). All three of these
cases dealt with Commission jurisdiction over early cable systems when, similar
to 2009, the Communications Act gave the Commission no express authority to
regulate such systems.
45
Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 646.
46
American Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
47
Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 646; see also 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2018).
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the Communications Act.48 However, the D.C. Circuit held that the
FCC failed to adequately justify exercise of ancillary authority to
regulate ISP’s network management practices, and that the FCC
could not use its ancillary authority to pursue a stand-alone policy
objective, rather than to support its exercise of a specifically
delegated power.49 Furthermore, the court disagreed with the FCC
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X, “already decided the
jurisdictional question here.”50
Following the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Comcast, the FCC
released a 2010 order establishing disclosure and transparency
requirements on ISPs.51 In the order, the FCC adopted three basic
rules “[t]o provide greater clarity and certainty regarding the
continued freedom and openness of the Internet.”52 The first rule
was “transparency,” which required:
A person engaged in the provision of broadband
Internet access service shall publicly disclose
accurate information regarding the network
management
practices,
performance,
and
commercial terms of its broadband Internet access
services sufficient for consumers to make informed
choices regarding use of such services and for
content, application, service, and device providers to
develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings. 53
The second rule prohibited ISPs from “blocking” content or
access.54 The rule stated, “[a] person engaged in the provision of
fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so

48

Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 646-47.
Id. at 659.
50
Id. at 649.
51
Matthew Lasar, It’s here: FCC adopts net neutrality (lite), ARS TECHNICA
(Dec. 21, 2010), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/12/its-here-fcc-adoptsnet-neutrality-lite/.
52
In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17906
(2010) [hereinafter Preserving the Open Internet].
53
47 C.F.R. § 8.3 (2011); see generally Preserving the Open Internet at
17937 (explaining the reasoning behind the rule).
54
Preserving the Open Internet 25 FCC Rcd. at 17906.
49

2020]

HARLEM SHAKE MEETS THE CHEVRON TWO STEP

171

engaged, shall not block lawful content, applications, services, or
nonharmful devices, subject to reasonable network management.”55
The final rule prohibited “unreasonable discrimination” in
“transmitting lawful network traffic,”56 meaning that “[a] person
engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service,
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably
discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic over a
consumer’s broadband Internet access service. Reasonable network
management shall not constitute unreasonable discrimination.”57
The order was summarily challenged by Verizon, 58 marking the
second time in less than five years in which the D.C. Circuit was
confronted with an FCC effort to compel broadband providers to
treat all internet traffic the same regardless of source. The FCC
claimed that § 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 vested it
with affirmative authority to enact measures encouraging the
deployment of broadband infrastructure.59 Verizon first claimed that
neither subsection (a) nor (b) of § 706 provided the FCC with any
regulatory authority.60 Second, Verizon argued that even if § 706
granted the FCC with the necessary authority, the “scope of that
grant” would not permit “the Commission to regulate broadband
providers in the manner that the Open Internet rules did.” 61 The
court had stated that Chevron deference was “warranted even if the
agency had interpreted a statutory provision that could be said to
delineate the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction.” 62
Verizon’s first claim was rejected. The D.C. Circuit ruled that
the FCC had “reasonably interpreted § 706 to empower” it to
promulgate rules governing broadband providers’ treatment of

55
47 C.F.R. §8.5 (2011); see generally Preserving the Open Internet at 25
FCC Rcd. at 17942 (explaining the reasoning behind the rule).
56
Preserving the Open Internet 25 FCC Rcd. at 17992.
57
27 C.F.R. § 8.7 (2011); see also Preserving the Open Internet 25 FCC
Rcd. at 17992.
58
Verizon Comm. Inc. v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
59
Id. at 634; Terry, Memmel & Turacek, supra note 4.
60
Verizon, 740 F.3d at 635.
61
Id.
62
Id.
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internet traffic.63 The court also concluded that the FCC’s
understanding of § 706(a) as a grant of regulatory authority
represented a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 64
Additionally, the court held that the Commission had authority
under the Telecommunications Act to take steps to accelerate
broadband deployment if and when it determined that existing
efforts were not “reasonable and timely.”65 Furthermore, the court
held that the FCC could compel fixed broadband providers under
the Telecommunications Act to adhere to open network
management practices that would meaningfully promote broadband
deployment.66
However, regarding Verizon’s second claim, the court found
that the FCC had chosen to classify broadband providers in a way
that exempts them from treatment as common carriers, and the
Communications Act expressly prohibits the Commission from
regulating them as such.67 Therefore, the court held that the FCC
had failed to establish that anti-blocking rules did not impose per se
common carrier obligations, vacating those portions of the 2010
order.68 The court went on to conclude that the anti-discrimination
and anti-blocking obligation imposed on fixed broadband providers
“relegated [those providers], pro tanto, to common carrier status,”69
also in violation of the Communications Act. The court therefore
vacated and remanded the anti-discrimination and the anti-blocking
rules.70
63

Id. at 628.
Id. at 637. The court further wrote that the Telecommunications Act of
1996 granted regulatory authority to the FCC and empowered it to promulgate
rules governing broadband providers’ treatment of Internet traffic, including
preserving and facilitating “virtuous circle” of innovation that had driven
explosive growth of Internet. However, the FCC was limited by its subject matter
jurisdiction and the requirement that any regulation be tailored to specific
statutory goal of accelerating broadband deployment. Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 643.
67
Id. at 652.
68
Id. at 628.
69
Id. at 655 (quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979)
(internal quotations omitted)).
70
Id. at 659.
64
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In this case, the court held that the FCC could, and perhaps
should, classify ISPs as Title II “common carriers” instead of under
Title I of the Communications Act of 1934.71 According to the court,
if the FCC did so, the agency would then have authority to regulate
ISPs by releasing orders like the one at issue in the case. 72 The
majority held that the FCC’s decision not to reclassify providers
under Title II as part of the 2010 order was a choice and that the
FCC should reconsider.73
In 2015, the FCC did just that in the Open Internet order, which
classified ISPs as common carriers under Title II and § 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.74
The Order enforced net neutrality through a variety of
provisions, including three bright-line rules prohibiting ISPs from
blocking and throttling lawful internet content, as well as prohibiting
paid prioritization for internet content delivery, which would allow
ISPs to favor some internet traffic over others. 75 Paid prioritization
refers to:
[T]he management of a broadband provider’s
network to directly or indirectly favor some traffic
over other traffic, including through use of
techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization,
resource reservation, or other forms of preferential
traffic management, either (a) in exchange for
consideration (monetary or otherwise) from a third
party, or (b) to benefit an affiliated entity. 76
71

Id. at 655.
Id. at 632 (quoting American Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691-92
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
73
Id. at 649.
74
47 C.F.R. § 8.2 (2015); see also Protecting and Promoting the Open
Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5614 (“Taking the Verizon decision’s implicit invitation,
we revisit the Commission’s classification of the retail broadband Internet access
service as an information service and clarify that this service encompasses the socalled ‘edge service.’”); see generally id. at 5721–24 (explaining the FCC’s use
of § 706 as a basis for authority over the open internet and designating ISPs as
common carriers).
75
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5647.
76
47 C.F.R. § 8.9(b) (2015); see generally Protecting and Promoting the
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In U.S. Telecom v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit upheld the 2015 Title
II order, finding that the FCC had the authority to impose such an
order, citing the suggestion made to the FCC by the majority in
Verizon.77 The case arose following the 2015 Title II Order when
several ISPs and industry associations petitioned for review in the
D.C. Circuit.
Conversely, U.S. Telecom argued that the Commission violated
§ 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires that a
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) “include . . . either the terms
or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and
issues involved.”78 In particular, U.S. Telecom argued that the FCC
violated this requirement because the proposed NPRM relied on §
706, not Title II.79
The D.C. Circuit rejected U.S. Telecom’s argument, finding that
the NPRM had satisfied the test for validity of its final decision of
reclassifying broadband service.80 The court also held that an NPRM
provided adequate notice when it “expressly ask[ed] for comments
on a particular issue or otherwise ma[de] clear that the agency [was]
contemplating a particular change.” 81
The D.C. Circuit held that the FCC had adequately addressed
commenters’ concerns about the agency’s decision to forbear from
applying mandatory network connection and facilities unbundling
requirements as part of actions to promote open internet, or “net
neutrality.”82 The court found that the FCC had authority to regulate
network connections, broadband service fell within FCC’s
jurisdiction as interstate service, and that the Commission had no
obligation to determine legal status of each underlying hypothetical

Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5653–59.
77
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (Telecom I), 825 F.3d 674, 740 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
78
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1966).
79
Telecom I, 825 F.3d at 700.
80
Id.
81
Id. (alterations ours) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. Surface Transp. Bd., 584
F.3d 1076, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
82
Id. at 730.
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regulatory obligation prior to undertaking forbearance analysis. 83
The court also held that the FCC was justified in reclassifying
broadband internet service as telecommunications service subject to
common carrier regulation under Title II of the Communications
Act.84 The court further found that “[c]ommon carriers have long
been subject to nondiscrimination and equal access obligations akin
to those imposed by the rules without raising any First Amendment
question.”85
The D.C. Circuit ultimately denied an en banc hearing, to which
then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh wrote a dissenting opinion.86
Kavanaugh argued that the FCC did not have the authority to
reclassify ISPs under the Communications Act of 1934. 87
Kavanaugh further contended that the 2015 Title II order had
violated ISPs’ First Amendment rights by infringing on their
editorial control and creating compelled speech.88 He cited two
Supreme Court cases89 as evidence that “the First Amendment bars
the Government from restricting the editorial discretion of Internet
service providers, absent a showing that an Internet service provider
possesses market power in a relevant geographic market.” 90
However, despite the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, the FCC voted 3-2
along party lines in December of 2017 to repeal its net neutrality
rules.91 The order first “[r]estor[ed] the classification of broadband
Internet access service as an ‘information service’” as it had been
classified prior to the 2015 Title II Order. 92 The FCC argued that
this action would allow for “light-touch” regulation meant to
promote “investment and innovation by removing regulatory
83

Id. at 730-31 (quoting AT & T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830, 836-37 (D.C.
Cir. 2006)).
84
Id. at 698; Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623; Terry, Memmel & Turacek,
supra note 4.
85
Telecom I, 825 F.3d at 740.
86
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (Telecom II), 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
87
Id. at 417.
88
Id. at 418.
89
Id. (citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994);
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997)).
90
Telecom II, 855 F.3d at 418.
91
Restoring Internet Freedom, 83 Fed. Reg. 7852.
92
Id.
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uncertainty and lowering compliance costs.”93 Second, the order
“[adopted] transparency requirements that ISPs disclose
information about their practices to consumers, entrepreneurs, and
the Commission.”94 The new rule required ISPs to disclose several
network practices, including instances of “blocking,” which the
FCC defined as “[a]ny practice (other than reasonable network
management elsewhere disclosed) that blocks or otherwise prevents
end user access to lawful content, applications, service, or nonharmful devices, including a description of what is blocked.” 95 ISPs,
also needed to disclose instances of “throttling,” which refers to
“[a]ny practice (other than reasonable network management
elsewhere disclosed) that degrades or impairs access to lawful
Internet traffic on the basis of content, application, service, user, or
use of a non-harmful device, including a description of what is
throttled.”96 Finally, ISPs were required to disclose instances of
“paid prioritization” and “affiliated prioritization,” meaning “[a]ny
practice that directly or indirectly favors some traffic over other
traffic, including through use of techniques such as traffic shaping,
prioritization, or resource reservation, to benefit an affiliate,
including identification of the affiliate.” 97 Additionally, the FCC
eliminated its conduct rules for ISPs, including the bright-line rules
preventing blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization. 98
Meanwhile, the FCC delayed the petition for review of Telecom
II seven times before the Court ultimately denied certiorari in the
case.99 Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh recused
themselves—Kavanaugh because he had already heard the case in
93

Id.
Id. at 7891.
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Id. at 7983.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 7896.
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Telecom II, 855 F.3d 674, appeal denied, No. 17-504 (2017); see also
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Harris,
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Clerk
(May
30,
2018),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17504/48612/20180530110336121_Extension%20Letter%2017-498%20%20%2017-504%208th.pdf.
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the D.C. Circuit.100 The FCC’s 2017 repeal of net neutrality, as well
as its delay in taking action on the petition for certiorari helped
extend the messy legal landscape around net neutrality, requiring
resolution that the D.C. Circuit has yet to provide and that the
Supreme Court may decline to consider. 101
B. Agency Decision-Making: Chevron Doctrine and Deference
A rationally based decision in a rulemaking inquiry is likely to
withstand judicial review when it has a number of relevant
characteristics. First, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that an agency’s
failure to provide any basis upon which its decisions were made
rendered any such decisions invalid.102 The court also reiterated
that the record of a rulemaking proceeding must contain the
information and other materials that the agency relied upon to ensure
that the decision was not arbitrary.103 Notably, the Supreme
Court has expanded the review of agency decision-making to
situations where an agency modifies existing rules; the agency is
also required to provide a reasonable analysis in support of
the decision.104
The Second Circuit ruled that effective judicial review of agency
decision-making requires a complete record providing not only the
agency’s interpretation of the statute it is implementing, but also a
full explanation of the agency’s reasoning.105 The D.C. Circuit held
100

Amy Howe, Divided Court Denies Review in “Net Neutrality” Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 5, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/dividedcourt-denies-review-in-net-neutrality-cases/.
101
Terry, Memmel & Turacek, supra note 4.
102
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
103
HBO v. FCC, 434 U.S. 988 (1977).
104
Motor Vehicles Mfr’s Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
105
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d
Cir. 1977). In Nova Scotia Foods the court quoted Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO
v. Hogson on this point, stating, “What we are entitled to at all events is a careful
identification by the Secretary, when his proposed standards are challenged, of
the reasons why he chooses to follow one course rather than another. Where that
choice purports to be based on the existence of certain determinable facts, the
Secretary must, in form as well as in substance, find those facts from evidence in
the record. By the same token, when the Secretary is obliged to make policy
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that to ensure a rational review of the agency decision-making
required the court to examine the technical evidence, much of which
was in dispute, to determine what information was used and what
was discarded by the agency.106 The failure of an agency to produce
a full record, as well as allow comments on the interpretation of the
statute and the data the agency relied on when promulgating a
regulation undermined the rationality of the decision by an
agency.107
The scope of review of agency action is specified in § 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), providing that “[a] reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions and determine the meaning
of applicability of the terms of an agency action.”108 Under § 706, a
reviewing court will set aside agency actions it determines to be
arbitrary and capricious.109
The Chevron decision, which set the modern standard for
judicial deference to agency decision-making, was an effort to
establish a standard to show deference to the agency’s expertise.110
Chevron provided parameters for the judiciary when reviewing
agency decisions to help prevent courts from determining policy by
overriding the agency’s expertise, which, in turn, would result in the
undermining of administrative agencies and their expertise in policy
implementation.111
When reviewing agency action, a court applies the Chevron test
to determine the legislative intent of a statute and what deference the
court owes the agency and its expertise.112 Under the first step of the
test, the court examines the controlling statute: if the meaning is
judgments where no factual certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide
the answer, he should so state and go on to identify the considerations he found
to be persuasive.” 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
106
Ethel Corp v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 51 F.3d 1053, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
107
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Castle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
108
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).
109
Id. § 706(2)(A).
110
See Chevron, Inc. v. Nat’l Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
838 (1984).
111
Id. at 865.
112
Id. at 843.
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unambiguous, that meaning is determinative.113 Under the second
step of the Chevron test, if a statute’s meaning is ambiguous, the
court must uphold any reasonable interpretation of the statute by the
agency, thus giving deference to the agency and its expertise.114
Traditionally a reviewing court would give less deference to an
agency’s legal conclusions than to an agency’s factual or
discretionary determinations as a result of the agency’s expertise.
Recently, judicial review of agency action has focused primarily on
whether the agency followed proper procedure and took a “hard
look” examination of the agency’s factual reasoning in the
record.115
Judicial review of agency action in formal proceedings is
conducted under APA § 706(2)(E), which codifies the substantial
evidence test. Under the substantial evidence test, courts uphold the
agency’s decision where the evidence reasonably supports the
agency’s stated conclusions.116 In so doing, the court is required to
look at the whole record, including the evidence that supports and
opposes the agency’s decision, as well as any decision by the
administrative law judge. In Edison v. National Labor Relations
Board, the Supreme Court had held that the burden of substantial
evidence has been met when an agency has relied on “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.”117
II. MOZILLA CORPORATION V. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (2019)
The D.C. Circuit held on October 1, 2019, that the FCC’s
reclassification of broadband internet under Title I of the
Telecommunications Act was “reasonable under Chevron,” finding
113

Id. at 842-43.
Id. at 843-44.
115
Ernest Gellhorn & Ronald Levin, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN
A NUTSHELL 99 (5th ed. 2006). In some cases, agencies have tried to limit the
necessary factual basis for a decision by interpreting a statute in a way that makes
the evidentiary requirements lower. Id at 183.
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5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1966).
117
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
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that the FCC “has compelling policy grounds to ensure consistent
treatment of the two varieties of broadband Internet access, fixed
and mobile, subjecting both, or neither, to Title II.”118
The per curiam decision was built around whether or not the
FCC had the right to reclassify fixed broadband from a
telecommunication service, as it had done in 2015, to an information
service in the 2017 net neutrality repeal.119 A corresponding
reclassification applied to mobile broadband, now designated as a
private mobile service.120 As part of the reclassification process, the
FCC relied on § 257 of the Communications Act of 1934 to adopt
transparency rules about Internet Service Providers’ network
practices.121 To support this regulatory approach, the FCC applied a
cost-benefit analysis, concluding that the regulatory burdens
brought about by reclassifying ISPs under Title II and imposing net
neutrality conduct rules exceeded their benefits. 122
The majority opinion circled around this central point several
times, granting a heavy deference to the FCC’s decision-making.
Relying on the reclassification authority provided to the FCC by the
2005 Brand X decision by the Supreme Court, as well as a liberal,
wide-ranging application of the Chevron deference standard, the
majority upheld the sections of the net neutrality repeal dealing with
reclassification.123
The D.C. Circuit first held that the decision in Brand X gave the
FCC a great deal of latitude in terms of decisions about how to
classify broadband, and that Chevron deference was appropriate to
the decision the agency made:124
All this of course proceeds in the shadow of Brand
X, which itself applied Chevron to a similar issue.
Applying these principles here, we hold that
classifying broadband Internet access as an
“information service” based on the functionalities of
118

Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 35.
Id. at 18.
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DNS and caching is “a reasonable policy choice for
the [Commission] to make’ at Chevron’s second
step.125
The majority declared that, in Brand X, the Supreme Court had
already held that it was reasonable for the FCC to conclude that DNS
and caching are information services integrated with the offering of
internet service.126 Likewise, Chevron authorized the FCC’s
conclusion that, “the vast majority of ordinary consumers . . . rely
upon the DNS functionality provided by their ISP as ‘part and parcel
of the broadband Internet access service.’”127 The majority held that
the lack of a clear delegation from Congress left the FCC in a
position to make some policy decisions, and that the lack of a
conceptual framework to the FCC at the time of the net neutrality
repeal or at the time of the 2015 Title II order had failed to provide
any mandate on how the agency should handle the relationship
between mobile broadband and VoIP. 128
Although some of the petitioners had raised specific challenges
to the FCC’s repeal of net neutrality as arbitrary and capricious, the
majority suggested that its review under the joint elements of Brand
X and Chevron was “particularly deferential.”129 As such, the
majority rejected arguments over the Restoring Internet Freedom
order’s transparency requirements, stating the FCC had clearly
explained the changes through cost benefit analysis. The majority
held, “The Commission explained that the “additional obligations
[of the former transparency rule did] not benefit consumers,
entrepreneurs, or the Commission sufficiently to outweigh the
burdens imposed on [broadband providers].”130
Despite the particularly deferential standard being applied, the
majority rejected the FCC’s suggestion to uphold the entire
rulemaking authority on the weight behind the FCC’s statutory
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Id. at 20.
Id. at 21–22.
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Id. at 33 (citing Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 1).
128
Id. at 40–43.
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interpretation alone.131 The FCC had contended that the
reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation had insulated the
Restoring Internet Freedom order from challenges that the order was
arbitrary and capricious.132 The majority stated that although there
was overlap between Chevron at step two and an arbitrary and
capricious review, the argument itself misunderstood the law, and
that each test in judicial review of the agency’s decision was
independent.133
The disagreement in the review process was a significant part of
the split between Chevron deference on most of the Restoring
Internet Freedom order and the portions of the order remanded by
the court.
The majority agreed that the FCC had advanced the reasonable
interpretation purposes of Chevron, but also ruled that the FCC’s
failure to assess the impact of repealing net neutrality on public
safety was still arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative
Procedure Act.134 In a similar line of reasoning, the majority applied
the split standard to the FCC’s considerations of the Restoring
Internet Freedom’s impact on pole-attachment regulation and the
Lifeline Program, ruling the decision-making by the FCC to be
inadequate on both issues.135 In terms of pole attachment, the FCC’s
reclassification of broadband in the Restoring Internet Freedom
order had created a statutory gap in FCC authority. 136
Petitioners challenged the FCC’s finding that reclassification of
broadband as an information service was, “likely to increase ISP
investment and output,” by objecting specifically to the studies the
agency had relied on and its failure to credit certain alternative
data.137 Again, by giving some credit to the FCC in terms of
deference, the majority did a separate arbitrary and capricious
review, and concluded that while some gaps may have existed, the

131

Id.
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 59–63.
135
Id. at 65–67.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 49.
132

2020]

HARLEM SHAKE MEETS THE CHEVRON TWO STEP

183

agency had acted rationally.138 The court wrote, “[w]e find that the
agency’s position as to the economic benefits of reclassification . . .
which the Commission sees as ‘particularly inapt for a dynamic
industry built on technological development and disruption,’ is
supported by substantial evidence . . . and so reject Petitioners’
objections.”139
The majority also agreed with the FCC’s cost benefit analysis
conclusion that the harms the 2015 Title II order was designed to
protect against could be achieved at a lower cost using transparency
requirements, consumer protection, and antitrust enforcement
measures.140 But the majority was quite skeptical, or even
“troubled,” by the FCC’s reliance on this analysis, pointing out that
the FCC had failed to consider that in one way or another, some form
of open internet conduct rules had been in effect for the majority of
the past twenty years.141 While chastising the FCC by pointing out
that Title II rules covered DSL service from the late 1990s until the
release of the FCC’s 2005 Wireline Broadband Order, the majority
did not believe this was grounds for a reversal:
We are . . . troubled by the Commission’s failure to
grapple with the fact that, for much of the past two
decades, broadband providers were subject to some
degree of open Internet restrictions. . . . The
Commission’s failure to acknowledge this regulatory
history, however, does not provide grounds for
reversal on this record given its view that market
forces combined with other enforcement
mechanisms, rather than regulation, are enough to
limit harmful behavior by broadband providers. 142
Net neutrality has been seen as a mechanism that protects and
fosters free expression online. The issue was a small element of the
decision, but the opinion’s heavy focus on deference reduced the
expression concerns to a secondary consideration. The majority
138
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suggested that, while petitioners had raised the issue, it was not an
important element of the challenge brought against the FCC’s repeal
of net neutrality.143 Calling the free expression challenge, “bareboned,” the majority ruled that the challenge did not represent
enough of a challenge to pose an issue for review by the court. 144
Beyond the limited nature of the petitioner’s challenge, the
majority also argued that the FCC had used a cost benefit analysis
in a reasonable way to support the “light-touch” regulation as a
mechanism to promote innovation and openness online. 145 As
regulatory responsibilities would shift from the FCC to the
Department of Justice and the FTC, incorporating controls designed
to protect competitive behavior, the court stated that it was
reasonable to “expect that competition would tend to multiply the
voices in the public square.”146
Relying on the FCC’s suggestion that under the order’s
transparency provisions, ISP commitments, and the threat of FTC
enforcement would act to protect free expression in a targeted way,
the majority accepted the FCC’s contention that anti-trust law would
protect competition which in turn will protect free expression. 147 But
the court also recognized the FCC was relying on a conceptual
premise where some consumers would be willing to accept some
infringement in trade for other benefits, holding that “[a]t the same
time, the Commission frankly acknowledges that “[t]he competitive
process and antitrust would not protect free expression in cases
where consumers have decided that they are willing to tolerate some
blocking or throttling in order to obtain other things of value.” 148
The court also rejected a challenge over evidence in the record
brought by Petitioner National Hispanic Media Coalition, which had
requested the FCC consider numerous informal consumer
complaints filed under the previous rules obtained from the FCC
through a Freedom of Information Act request. 149 The FCC denied
143
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the motion to include the informal comments on the grounds that it
was “exceedingly unlikely” that those complaints raised any issue
that was not already identified in the large quantity of material in the
record.150
The FCC’s victory in Mozilla was one with narrow margins and
required the agency to address three key issues: the agency’s
preemption directive, pole attachment authority, and the Lifeline
program.151
First, the Court concludes that the Commission has
not shown legal authority to issue its Preemption
Directive, which would have barred states from
imposing any rule or requirement that the
Commission “repealed or decided to refrain from
imposing” in the Order or that is “more stringent”
than the Order. The Court accordingly vacates that
portion of the Order. Second, we remand the Order
to the agency on three discrete issues: (1) The Order
failed to examine the implications of its decisions for
public safety; (2) the Order does not sufficiently
explain what reclassification will mean for
regulation of pole attachments; and (3) the agency
did not adequately address Petitioners' concerns
about the effects of broadband reclassification on the
Lifeline Program.152
The court added that these “aspects of the Commission’s
decision are still arbitrary and capricious under the [APA] because
of the [FCC’s] failure to address [these] important and statutorily
mandated consideration[s].”153
As several observers explained, the first issue meant that the
FCC does not have the legal authority to prohibit state legislatures
from passing their own net neutrality rules, 154 with some states
already taking such actions prior to the D.C. Circuit ruling. 155 The
150
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second issue meant that the FCC had other portions of its Restoring
Internet Freedom order that needed to be addressed, including those
related to ISPs throttling data services of public safety departments
like in Santa Clara.
Governmental petitioners challenged the repeal of net
neutrality’s preemption directive, arguing that the way the FCC was
applying preemption exceeded the agency’s statutory authority. 156
The majority ruled that the directive was far beyond simple conflict
preemption, that the FCC had ignored binding precedent and “[t]hat
failure is fatal.”157 Arguing that the FCC had given itself powers to
invalidate all state and local laws that interfered with either federal
regulatory objectives or any element of broadband service, the
majority ruled that the preemption directive functionally represented
a prejudged intent, in place from the moment it went into effect, for
the FCC to preempt any state laws that would conflict with the
Restoring Internet Freedom order. 158 The court further argued that:
For the Preemption Directive to stand, then, the
Commission must have had express or ancillary
authority to issue it. It had neither. The Preemption
Directive could not possibly be an exercise of the
Commission’s express statutory authority. By
reclassifying broadband as an information service,
the Commission placed broadband outside of its Title
II jurisdiction.159
Although the FCC’s decision to reclassify broadband under Title
I was a valid policy choice, the FCC argued that it could not simply
turn around and argue for preemption authority by analogy. 160 The
majority proposed that the FCC go back to Congress with any
complaints about this statutory gap. 161 According to the court,
156
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absent new Congressional action, the ability of the FCC to apply
preemption to competing laws at the state or local level required the
agency to identify an applicable statutory delegation of regulatory
authority, an act the majority clearly stated the FCC had failed to do
in the 2018 order.162
Lacking any legal authority, the FCC’s action to preempt even
potential laws in every state was a step too far. Vacating the FCC’s
preemption directive from the Restoring Internet Freedom Order,
the court also ruled that because no state laws were at issue in the
case, it was, “premature to pass on the preemptive effect, under
conflict or other recognized preemption principles, of the remaining
portions of the 2018 Order.”163
Preemption was also a significant issue in the arguments raised
in the concurring opinions by Judges Patricia Millett and Robert L.
Wilkins, as well as Judge Stephen F. Williams’s opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part. Judge Millet’s concurring opinion
came with “substantial reservations.”164 Agreeing that Brand X
provided a clear precedent to uphold the FCC’s reclassification of
broadband as an information service as reasonable, Judge Millet
stated a deep concern that the “result is unhinged from the realities
of modern broadband service.”165
Arguing that the FCC’s analysis focused on the value added to
consumers rather than tie that value to a convenient item that had
promoted the FCC’s policy preferences, Judge Millet suggested that
the FCC’s decision was divorced from market realities and was,
“performing Hamlet without the Prince”166 because the FCC’s
policy had wrongly declared the transmission element as an
information service rather than the integrated component or pet and
leash standard proposed by Brand X.167
Noting that the FCC’s capricious view of what constituted an
information service would risk one point that all sides had agreed
on, that traditional telephone belonged within the common carrier
162
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constraints of Title II, Judge Millet suggested that the FCC had made
a concerning decision that had drifted beyond the boundaries of its
statutory authority and discretion.168 Despite the concern, Judge
Millet also found that it was the Supreme Court’s “prerogative” to
reexamine Brand X in more contemporary terms and to require the
FCC to bring the regulation in line with the realities of the
contemporary broadband market.169 Until either the Supreme Court
or Congress forced the FCC into action, Judge Millet explained that
she was bound to concur in sustaining the Commission’s action. 170
Judge Williams’ lengthy opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part was largely focused on the preemption issue.171
Judge Williams was extremely skeptical that the majority could
agree to grant deference to the FCC over major portions of the Open
Internet order, but undermine the preemption directive because the
FCC’s decision to move broadband regulation to Title I was
predicated heavily on preemption authority. 172
Arguing that since there were no examples of state laws that
would be in conflict with the FCC’s Title I authority that leaned
heavily in favor of waiting until a specific challenge arose, Judge
Williams also suggested that Congress had a significant role to play
in resolving the boundaries of the FCC’s preemption authority under
Title I.173 Agreeing with the majority decision that the 1996
Telecommunication Act provided the FCC the authority to apply
either Title I or Title II, Judge Williams argued that not extending
the same level of deference to the FCC on the preemption directive
would undermine the 2018 order by exposing broadband to a
patchwork of intrusive state regulations. 174
III. DISCUSSION
This Part argues that the D.C. Circuit ruling not only failed to
fully clarify the net neutrality debate, but also raised new questions,
168
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including several for the FCC to address. In order to see the net
neutrality debate resolved, the most logical solution would be an
updated delegation of authority from Congress. Although at least
four states, including California, had passed state level provisions
before the Mozilla decision, state level provisions will likely confuse
the issue even more as the FCC and states battle over preemption.
A. D.C. Circuit Left Net Neutrality Unresolved
Taken as a whole, the D.C. Circuit ruling left many questions
unanswered (and likely created new ones), which are related to net
neutrality in three ways. First, because the D.C. Circuit held that the
FCC was within its authority to repeal the net neutrality rules and
reclassify broadband internet under Title I of the
Telecommunications Act, it seems the court would likely reach a
similar ruling if the agency were to once again classify ISPs under
Title II. Such an action remains a possibility, especially if a
Democratic administration takes the White House and the FCC in
2020. The result is that the future of net neutrality remains in
question when a different FCC has deference to reclassify
broadband internet once again.
Second, the D.C. Circuit overturned the preemption doctrine,
which functionally prohibits the FCC from attempting to bar state
legislation and executive orders creating new net neutrality rules. 175
Although allowing the FCC to bar such laws would have helped
resolve the net neutrality debate and aid implementation across the
United States, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling meant that state legislatures
and governors will likely continue to take actions aimed at net
neutrality. As discussed more below, several states prior to 2019 had
already taken actions towards implementing net neutrality rules,
with likely more states to follow.176 The result would be varying net
neutrality protections depending on which state an ISP and/or
consumer is located, leading to a complicated and messy legal
landscape. Furthermore, such efforts by states could become the
subject of lawsuits, perhaps even by the FCC, further muddying net
neutrality protections across the country.
175
176

Id. at 86.
See infra notes 184–199.
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Finally, the D.C. Circuit remanding three issues to the FCC
meant that those questions remain unanswered and require new
attention by the agency. As the situation with Verizon in Santa Clara
demonstrated, ISPs and consumers have already disagreed about the
cause and intent behind throttling even in public safety situations,
suggesting that such disagreement and contentiousness will only
continue moving forward as ISPs test the boundaries of blocking,
throttling, and paid prioritization.
Although the D.C. Circuit ruling on the surface clarified key
questions about net neutrality rules, it, in fact, only further
complicated the legal picture. The ruling ultimately left the door
open for the FCC to take actions under different administrations,
meaning the net neutrality debate could continue to go back and
forth for years to come.
B. Congress or the States Need to Provide Resolution to the Net
Neutrality Debate
We argue that Congress needs to provide at least some resolution
to the net neutrality debate by directing the FCC. On one hand,
Congress could pass legislation preventing the FCC from enforcing
net neutrality regulations, though such efforts currently face
significant opposition.177 Alternatively, Congress could make key
and necessary changes to the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
clarifying whether ISPs fall under Title I as information services or
Title II as telecommunication services subject to common carrier
regulation. Certainly, Congress could take addition actions to amend
or otherwise change the law as well. Nevertheless, the result would
be an end to the back-and-forth that has taken place between
different FCC administrations about the classification of ISPs. This
would potentially result in companies being classified one way or
177
See Mallory Locklear, Net neutrality still faces an uphill battle in
Congress,
ENGADGET
(May
16,
2018),
https://www.engadget.com/2018/05/16/net-neutrality-faces-uphill-battle-incongress/; Makena Kelly, White House Threatens To Veto Democrat-Led Net
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(Apr.
8,
2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/8/18301124/white-house-trump-netneutrality-veto-bill-democrats-congress.
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another, meaning under Title I or Title II, therefore either allowing
or restricting rules around blocking, throttling, and paid
prioritization.
Significantly, Congress has shown that it can take at least some
actions related to net neutrality. On May 16, 2018, the U.S. Senate
passed a resolution of disapproval aiming to block the FCC’s repeal
of net neutrality.178 Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) had
previously introduced the resolution of disapproval in February
2018179 under the Congressional Review Act, which allows
Congress 60 days to challenge new rules passed by an independent
agency, such as the FCC.180 The Senate voted 52-47 in favor of the
resolution, with all 49 Democratic senators voting for the resolution,
as well as three Republicans.181
On April 10, 2019, several media outlets reported that the U.S.
House of Representatives had passed a bill by a 232-190 vote aiming
to reinstate the net neutrality protections passed by the FCC in
2015.182 However, Vox reported that President Trump said he would
178
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(Apr.
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veto the bill and that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell
called the bill “dead on arrival in the Senate.” 183
If Congress fails to act or provide sufficient resolution to the net
neutrality debate, it would fall on the states to implement such rules.
Although states may be able to provide some resolution, a
patchwork of state laws will not provide lasting, consistent or
coherent resolution to the already complicated legal and policy net
neutrality landscape.
In 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law SB
822, the California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality
Act of 2018.184 The California law prohibits ISPs from “[b]locking
lawful content, applications, services, or nonharmful devices,
subject to reasonable network management.” 185 The law also
prohibits the “[i]mpairing or degrading [of] Internet traffic on the
basis of Internet content, application, or service, or use of a
nonharmful device,” meaning ISPs cannot impair or degrade “(1)
particular content, applications, or services; (2) particular classes of
content, applications, or services; (3) lawful Internet traffic to
particular nonharmful devices; or (4) lawful Internet traffic to
particular classes of nonharmful devices.”186 Additionally, the law
prohibits “paid prioritization,” which the law defines as the
“management of an Internet service provider’s network to directly
or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic.” 187
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However, approximately an hour after Governor Brown signed
the California law, the U.S. DOJ filed a lawsuit in federal court in
California to block the law from going into effect, arguing that
California lacked sufficient authority to regulate ISPs.188 On
October 26, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra and the
DOJ agreed to postpone litigation pending the D.C. Circuit’s ruling
in Mozilla.189 As discussed above, because of the D.C. Circuit’s
ruling on the state’s rights issue, the fight over net neutrality will
likely continue in California.
California, however, is not the only state to consider net
neutrality legislation. The National Conference of State Legislatures
reported in January 2019 that net neutrality legislation had been
introduced in 29 states, with over 65 bills introduced requiring
internet service providers to ensure various net neutrality
principles.190 In 13 states and Washington, D.C., 23 resolutions have
been introduced opposing the repeal of net neutrality rules, urging
Congress to take action to restore the rules, or stating the state’s
support for net neutrality principles.191
In 2018, both Washington and Oregon passed legislation
enforcing net neutrality requirements for government agencies
working with ISPs.192 On March 6, 2018, Washington Governor Jay
Inslee signed House Bill 2282, which first requires “[a]ny person
providing broadband internet access service in Washington state [to]
188
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publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network
management practices, performance characteristics, and
commercial terms of its broadband internet access services.” 193
Second, the law prohibits any “person engaged in the provision of
broadband internet access service in Washington state” from “(a)
Block[ing] lawful content, applications, services, or nonharmful
devices, subject to reasonable network management; (b) Impair[ing]
or degrad[ing] lawful internet traffic on the basis of internet content,
application, or service . . . or (c) Engag[ing] in paid
prioritization.”194 The law therefore reflects the FCC’s net neutrality
rules passed in 2015.
Like the Washington statute, ORS § 276A.418 (2019) prohibits
a public body from contracting “with a broadband Internet access
service provider” that:
(a) Engages in paid prioritization;
(b) Blocks lawful content, applications or services or
nonharmful devices;
(c) Impairs or degrades lawful Internet traffic for the
purpose of discriminating against or favoring certain
Internet content, applications or services or the use
of nonharmful devices;
(d) Unreasonably interferes with or unreasonably
disadvantages an end user’s ability to select, access
and use the broadband Internet access service or
lawful Internet content, applications or services or
devices of the end user’s choice; or
(e) Unreasonably interferes with or unreasonably
disadvantages an edge provider’s ability to make
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devices or lawful content, applications or services
available to end users.195
The law also requires that ISPs “publicly disclose information
regarding the provider’s network management practices and
performance characteristics and the commercial terms of the
provider’s broadband Internet access service sufficient for end users
to verify that the service is provided in compliance with subsections
(3) and (4) of this section.”196
Additionally, several state governors signed executive orders
requiring public-sector businesses, organizations, and agencies in
their states to only work with ISPs that uphold or practice net
neutrality principles.197 For example, in Hawaii, Governor David
Ige’s Executive Order No. 18-02 directed all state government
agencies to only contract with ISPs “who demonstrate and
contractually agree to support and practice net neutrality principles
where all Internet traffic is treated equally.” 198 Rhode Island, New
Jersey, New York, Montana, and Vermont also required state
entities award future contracts only to ISPs that adhere to these net
neutrality principles, which generally prohibit blocking, throttling,
and paid prioritization of lawful internet content by ISPs. 199
195
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Lastly, mayors in hundreds of jurisdictions around the United
States signed a petition ensuring that their local governments would
only work with ISPs that uphold/practice net neutrality principles, 200
demonstrating that the debate around net neutrality, including after
the D.C. Circuit ruling, can and will continue at the local level as
well.
Taken as a whole, the actions by Congress and several states lead
to two conclusions. First, they demonstrate the complexity of the net
neutrality debate, which necessitates some resolution. Because the
D.C. Circuit left the door wide open for Congressional and state
actions, such complexity is unlikely to be resolved quickly or easily.
Second, if Congress fails to act, states are likely to continue to try to
provide resolution, though it will likely only further complicate the
legal landscape.201
C. Congress or the States Should Uphold Net Neutrality
Principles
Although this Article argues that Congress or the states need to
provide resolution one way or another, it further contends that each
would, ideally, implement complementary net neutrality rules. We
argue that there are several reasons to do so, but perhaps one of the
most important is that such rules promote free expression on the
internet.
The internet promotes key values—free expression, access to
information, and viewpoint diversity—that have been the focus of
past media systems, including the Postal Service, telegraph, and
radio.202 At the same time, although refuted by some scholars, the
200
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internet does raise issues of scarcity along the same vein as radio.
Scarcity is a concept traditionally associated with electromagnetic
spectrum, but is analogous to bandwidth limitations as well as the
availability of internet service. Regarding radio, scarcity arises in
that broadcast spectrum is limited or scarce. 203 Jeremy Lipschultz
argued that scarcity arises in relation to the internet because “the
existing network has seen a considerable slowdown in data transfer;
the system at times reached capacity, resulting in no service for the
user.” 204 In short, high traffic online can create slower speeds for
users, limiting their ability to see certain content. Perhaps more
significantly, there are many places in the United States where
individuals not only do not have a choice of ISP, but, in some cases,
have no ISP at all, meaning they cannot access the internet. 205 The
FCC has been tasked with overseeing broadband deployment to
these rural areas, but the ability to access the internet remains
impossible for some and nearly impossible for others who have
speeds of 25 Mbps or less.206
Because of the physical problems associated with internet
access, net neutrality can be seen as a “technocratic solution,” 207 or,
dealing with freedom of expression, access to information, privacy and
intellectual property. The second area of constitutive choices deal with the design
of a country’s communication media and networks, as well as, its larger industrial
organization. Finally, the third area of choices includes the decision-making, the
support for and the acceptance of education, research, and innovation all of which
play a role in how technology is deployed.
203
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at the very least, part of a larger set of technocratic solutions to
scarcity, such as the widespread market failures caused by a lack of
broadband competition.208 Net neutrality promotes free expression
by ensuring that users have access to information and content online.
It does so by preventing ISPs from blocking, throttling, or otherwise
discriminating against content, which would limit the information
some users would be able to see. This is significant because, in
Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court recently ruled
that access to social media, and the internet more generally, was a
necessary function/ability of anyone in the United States, even those
convicted of crimes.209 In short, net neutrality is meant to ensure the
free flow of information to any individual using the internet,
providing them with information that allows them to be an informed
voter, to be entertained, or to otherwise benefit from internet
content. The FCC seems to understand that net neutrality comes
with a free expression component, but argues that free expression is
potentially a consumer’s bargaining chip that can be traded for some
form of undefined benefit in the “light-touch” regime. 210 Yet,
without net neutrality rules, ISPs would, at a minimum, have the
ability and authority to limit access to certain information, an action
participants to argue that technological, rather than traditional political, solutions,
are most appropriate for solving social problems resulting from technological
developments.”).
208
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that has already taken place211 and that is antithetical to the core
values of access to information and free expression.
CONCLUSION
In its October 1, 2019 ruling, the D.C. Circuit allowed for the
repeal of the net neutrality rules passed during President Barack
Obama’s administration, finding that the FCC had the authority to
reclassify broadband internet under Title I and, therefore, allowing
ISPs to block, throttle, or otherwise discriminate against certain
internet content. However, the court also remanded several issues
back to the FCC for the agency to address. As this Article argued,
the result of the court’s ruling was that the net neutrality debate
remained unresolved as future FCC administrations retain the ability
to reclassify ISPs once more, among other questions raised by the
D.C. Circuit ruling.
Therefore, it is necessary for Congress to step in and offer at
least some guidance on net neutrality, providing at least some
resolution to a debate that has lasted nearly 15 years. Although any
form of resolution would be beneficial at this stage, Congress or
states should allow for the implementation of net neutrality rules
once again in order to protect the free flow of information, as well
as users’ ability to access content online; values at the heart of
American media systems dating back to the 18th century.
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